Arnold G. York
A tragic alternative
Over the last few weeks I’ve started half dozen columns about the situation in the Middle East, but they’ve all stalled. I found it nearly impossible to take apart the pieces and make any sense of them. Part of the problem is that the situation between Israel and Hamas is very different than that between Israel and Hezbollah, so I decided to begin with the Palestinians (Hamas and Fatah) and leave Lebanon for another column (our assistant editor Jonathan Friedman, however, states his thoughts on Lebanon on page 7).
For almost 60 years, the Palestinians have been stateless. Some live in the state of Israel, some in what was initially thought to be temporary camps outside of Israel, and the rest are spread out in a diaspora throughout the Middle East and other parts of the world. Despite many internal differences within the Palestinian movement, they seemed to have one unified goal, and that is to have a homeland of their own.
In pursuit of that goal, they and a number of Arab nations have fought several wars with Israel (1948, 1957, 1973), and numerous other battles and hostilities over the years. Although it appeared that a number of the Arab states were considerably less interested in a Palestinian homeland than they were in destroying Israel, even the most diehard knew that after a continuous sequence of defeats, they were not going to achieve their objectives militarily. Thus, they switched to other methods; some states pursued political, economic or diplomatic methods to do battle, while the Palestinians turned alternatively from negotiation to terrorism, suicide bombings and the Intifada. While none of those methods has yet accomplished the objective of a Palestinian homeland, they did put the Middle East onto the world’s radar screen. Finally things began to happen. The Egyptians and Israelis signed a peace accord. There was Oslo and Camp David, and though there were many false starts and backtracking, there seemed to be movement toward a Palestinian state.
A solution was very difficult. There were vast internal conflicts on both sides. The Palestinians were divided between Fatah, run by Yasser Arafat and the old timers, and the younger more militant wing, which generally moved toward Hamas. The Israelis were also divided between the Labor Party and the government led by the Likud Party and their war hero, hawk and the founder of the settlement movement, Ariel Sharon. Then a couple of things happened. Arafat died and the entire Palestinian movement was looking for new leadership. Suddenly everything was up for grabs. At the same time, on the Israeli side, Sharon began to shift his position on Israeli settlements in the occupied areas. I can only assume it was becoming more and more apparent to him that these settlements, particularly those in Gaza and in the more isolated portions of the West Bank, were nearly impossible to defend with anything less than a large standing army. Many Israelis and the army questioned their role as occupiers, protecting a relatively small group of settlers. It appeared to make less and less sense.
Another factor was the population bombshell. The number of Palestinians was growing at a much faster rate than the number of Israelis. Unless two separate countries were established, within a generation or two Israel would be overrun. Knowing this, Sharon probably felt it was time to take decisive action, even if it meant removing the settlers from Gaza, by force if necessary, bolt his own political party (of which he was a founder) and create a new party. Even after he suffered a career-ending stroke, his successor Ehud Olmert, a relatively colorless politician, was able to step in. The new party won enough seats to create a majority coalition, thus substantiating his view that the Israeli body politic supported his position: get out of Gaza, leave parts of the West Bank and implicitly create the conditions for a Palestinian statehood.
There was also a major shift in the Palestinian electorate, bringing Hamas to power and unseating many of the old Fatah leadership, who many saw as corrupt. Initially there was the usual rhetoric. Hamas, consistent with its pre-election position, said it was still committed to the destruction of Israel. And the Western world continued to treat it as a terrorist organization. However, change was underway and it seemed to me that time was now on the side of Hamas.
If Hamas had waited and done nothing-no attacks, no suicide bombings, no assassinations-and if the Gaza remained quiet, the situation was headed to some sort of a detente between Israel and the Palestinians. And Israel probably would have begun to evacuate some of the West Bank settlements. While there would, no doubt, have been many remaining major differences (final borders, the wall and East Jerusalem to name a few), some sort of solution began to look possible. There would have been all sorts of monetary concessions from the Israelis and the world to the Palestinians to make the deal work. I believed it would have happened not because the Israelis were good guys, or that they were being pressured by the U.S. or EU, but because it had become apparent to Israel it was in its own national interest that the Palestinians have their own state. In fact, it was already beginning to happen. Fatah and Hamas had a tentative agreement that implicitly recognized Israel. While no one realistically expected Hamas to say it changed its mind and no longer wanted the destruction of Israel (a party can’t get into power and then say it never meant what it was saying before without losing credibility), they could have defused the situation by backing off a bit on the rhetoric and most of the world would have cut them considerable slack.
So what happened?
A military group, which included Hamas, crossed into Israel, killed some Israeli soldiers and took a young corporal prisoner. All hell broke loose. Still, Hamas could have prevented Israel’s inevitable return strikes if the Hamas leadership had acknowledged that the attack and kidnapping represented the action of a renegade group that had acted without authorization. If the Israeli soldier had been returned, the incident would be nothing but a footnote in history, but that didn’t happen.
The question is why?
I would guess the reason Hamas didn’t back down is the decision was out of their hands and Syrian and/or Iranian leaders called the shots. The Hamas Palestinian government either didn’t have the nerve or the muscle to buck them. The real power in the Middle East (Syria and Iran), I must assume, was not really interested in a Palestinian state. They had a different agenda. An ongoing Palestinian / Israeli conflict suited that agenda just fine. It appears to me that that’s the way the Israelis read the situation. The local Hamas action (or inaction) clearly indicated there is nothing to be gained for Israel in facilitating the development of a Palestinian state and that the best policy was to treat Hamas as they treated Arafat. Destroy everything around them until there is nothing but rubble and slowly strangle their state.
It’s a very tragic alternative. Sad for the Israelis who are now committed to the harshest of measures, and sadder still for the Palestinians who appeared so close to realizing their dreams and then let it slip away-once again.