That’s all he has to say about Iraq
In reply to your e-mail asking me to “Send me (Arnold York) a letter describing what victory looks like in Iraq. Who knows? Maybe I’ll see the light.” In 350 words (you will be lucky if I’m so succinct), I respond that the USA’s commitment in Iraq can only be understood backwards. However, it must be lived forwards.
A liberationist would regard a classic work on political philosophy, “The Prince,” in which Niccolo Machiavelli advises that republics, having been accustomed to their own liberty, are the ones that are difficult to occupy. The vitality of such a republic will not “allow the memory of their former liberty to rest,” and here Machiavelli’s advice to his Prince is quite unpleasant. “So that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.” Iraq, a notorious “Republic of Fear,” would be for Machiavelli a straightforward project. Those accustomed to the tyranny of one prince, he argued, will just as easily adjust to another.
Troubling and imperative questions arise from Machiavelli’s insights. In a post-Saddam Iraq, will the United States provide that tyranny? Will the people of Iraq take up arms and be unable to agree and govern themselves? And, if occupation is to become liberation, i.e., democratization, how do we get there?
Although Machiavelli-if he not me, were writing The Malibu Times today-might see Iraq as an easy prospect for a would-be prince. The United States does not wish to rule Iraq indefinitely as Machiavelli’s prince would do. The United States government alone cannot make that transformation happen; it is a project Iraqis themselves must engage in.
Prospective Iraqi military partners notwithstanding, security is but one of a number of fundamentals for post-conflict reconstruction, and must be considered as part of a package of processes that includes economic development, transitional justice and the rule of law, and the infrastructure needed for participatory governance. Iraq’s transformation will depend upon assistance from the international community more broadly, including international and nongovernmental organizations with material and human resources to contribute. The need for extensive support is particularly acute given doubts about American commitment to the long-term welfare of the Iraqi people and given vehement anti-American sentiment in the Middle East.
As Iraq transforms, the United States, as an external authority, will have to make some transitions. It is vital to consider carefully the form of transitional authority to be put in place in post-conflict Iraq. External authority, it is argued, must fit the case: the root of the conflict; the capacity for change; international commitment; and the number of factions, their capability and hostility.
Sir Winston Churchill, in his 1899 book “The Rivers War,” confirmed that the Arab factions are numerous, incoherent and mutually hostile, a conflict environmentalism that calls for executive, supervisory authority, just as in Iraq today. Post-conflict ecology is dangerous, but given the magnitude of great power interest, as compared to Somalia, for example, resources are more likely to be brought to bear to manage it. Unfortunately, divisions among the great powers, including potential competition over post-conflict oil contracts (the spoils of war), make this conflict ecology dangerous in a broader sense even than the war over Kosovo.
Looking at post-conflict operations over time, the United States and other peace-building partners have developed a specialization model that puts a robust military in the lead for combat operations. It seems likely that as long as there are international forces on Iraq soil, the U.S. military will not hand off lead responsibility. A military footprint is going to shape other aspects of the post-conflict transition as well.
In his book, “Buddha’s Child,” former Prime Minister of South Vietnam, Nguyen Cao Ky, points out that under the rule of a totalitarian dictatorship, similar to Saddam Hussein, high governmental positions are filled by the cream of the political crop most likely to flee the country during governmental upheaval, leaving the state unable to provide the veteran leadership needed to run an inexperienced republic, a problem for Iraq.
Mr. York, you should be embarrassed to die until you have won some victory for humanity. This is “the light” you are looking for. An appealing humanitarian panorama is a disarmed, peaceful, transformed Iraq that shines as a light of democracy in the region. The current U.S. military footprint in Iraq seems the likely consequence of the ecology of the conflict and the goal of transformation.
I return to the Machiavellian prescription of tyranny with a twist: a liberation agenda. I never promised you or your readers a “Garden of Eden” at the end of the Iraq conflict. What I hope for and inscribed is that in time, maybe “liberation theology” will take hold, and the people of Iraq will acquire a thirst for freedom and self-governance. Let us look forward to being well out of the occupation business when that happens.
And that is all I have to say.
Tom Fakehany