Arnold G. York
Sending more troops to Iraq a mistake
One of the consequences of making a bad decision is that while you keep trying to fix it, all you end up doing is making a follow-up sequence of even worse decisions, which dig you deeper into a hole.
Listening to George Bush is like listening to Lyndon Johnson in the ’60s trying to save our fight in Vietnam. Johnson was caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. We were losing. The Viet Cong kept getting stronger and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam weaker. The choices presented to Johnson were always the same: total capitulation to communism (which was unacceptable) versus substantially growing the size of the war (or nuking Hanoi, which was totally unconscionable), or taking the third, more moderate course and sending in 50,000 more troops. He, of course, chose what seemed the most reasonable option, the last of the three. And he chose it again and again until even he realized it was not going to work. His presidency was effectively over, and the nasty job of getting out and mopping up would be left to the next man, who, as it turned out, was Richard Nixon.
Sadly, sending 25,000 more troops into Iraq sounds very much like that third alternative.
I believe it won’t work. Heck, sending in 125,000 more troops won’t work. The only real option open to Bush is to begin the process of withdrawal. The reason sending more troops won’t work is that the factions in Iraq don’t really want to solve this problem of ending the insurgency because they’re all part of it. A standoff, a Balkanized Iraq, is a solution they can all live with.
Our solution, which appears to be a strongly centralized government with a national army, is a danger to all factions. And although they’ll pay lip service to it to keep our dollars flowing and to keep us as a buffer zone, I suspect they have no intention of going any farther than that unless they have to. And with us there, increasing our commitment, they don’t have to.
Every faction-whether Shia, Sunni or Kurd-has its own people to think about. These people owe their jobs and their security, and even the safety of themselves, their families and their clans, to the one faction to which they belong. The leaders of that faction must stay alive, bring in the dollars and protect their own people from the other factions.
Can the president’s 25,000 new troops change this equation?
I think not very likely.
For one thing, it’s not nearly enough troops to make a difference.
If he puts those 25,000 troops into Baghdad, the insurgency will just shift to the other less centralized cities outside of Baghdad. If he spreads those troops around, there won’t be enough in any one location to make a difference.
The various groups of insurgents each have their own private militia. Their political clout depends on maintaining that militia as a viable military force. They’re not going to disband their private armies. If they did, they’d be vulnerable and some other faction would knock them off.
Maintaining their militias makes sense because, otherwise, they’d be putting their security into our hands, which they won’t do.
First and foremost, they can’t put their security into our hands because we are only there temporarily. Some time in the future, whether it’s next month or in five years, we’re going to be gone and that Iraqi politician is still going to be there, so he has to think long-term and hedge all of his bets.
If he’s too friendly or dependent on the Americans, he’s seen as a sell-out or a toady, and when we’re gone he’s also going to be gone. That means he’s got to stay friendly with us for now because he wants our money and our support, but at the same time he needs to cover his own back.
How does he do that? He does that by maintaining some relationship with all the factions, because someday in the future he’s going to have to deal with them. Part of him has to prove to the other factions that he’s tough and well financed and no pushover, but also that he’s no American patsy.
So what happens? Every time we send out troops on a mission he’s going to tip the other side just to make sure he’s covering all his bases. Iraq is sort of like Chicago in the days of the bootleggers.
The bottom line, I believe, is the only chip we have to play is our withdrawal. By the simple act of withdrawal from a particular area, one faction or another is going to seize that area. We can bargain each step of our withdrawal by delivering one portion or another of the country to one faction or another. This week to the Sunni. Next week to the Shi’as.
If we decided to do it all at once, it would be riskier. Iraq would probably be plunged into civil war, or alternatively, all the factions might have to begin to deal with each other and they would find some way to declare a truce. As long as we’re there, they don’t have to confront each other, particularly if they can count on America to send more troops to try and keep the peace.
I don’t know what the White House is thinking. I just can’t see that the president’s plan to send more troops makes any sense. I simply can’t understand the White House concept of victory. If there is a rationale for this, it sure escapes me.